The No Surprises Act (NSA) was created to help protect consumers with private insurance from surprise medical bills from out-of-network health care providers. The NSA requires the Department of Health and Human Services to prepare annual reports to Congress on the effects of the NSA's provisions. This article summarizes findings of an environmental scan on consolidation trends and impacts in health care markets. It describes the evidence on price, spending, quality of care, access, and wages in health care provider and insurance markets, as well as other market trends. The authors found strong evidence that hospital horizontal consolidation is associated with higher prices paid to providers and some evidence of the same for vertical consolidation of hospitals and physician practices. Health care spending is likely to increase in tandem with these price increases. Most studies find decreased or no change in quality of care associated with consolidation; however, findings differ by quality measures examined and setting. Horizontal consolidation of commercial insurers is associated with lower prices paid to providers as insurers gain market power in negotiations with providers, but the lower prices paid to providers do not appear to be passed onto consumers, who face higher premiums following insurer consolidation. There is insufficient evidence of the effects on patient access to care and health care wages. The few evaluations of state surprise billing laws have found heterogeneous effects on prices and have not directly examined effects on spending, quality, patient access, and wages.
Keywords: Health Care Access; Health Care Price Competition; Health Care Quality; Health Insurance Markets; Hospitals; Physicians.
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